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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. 
WESLEY JAMES LONG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
> APPELLANT'S OPENING 
> BRIEF 
i Priority No. 2 
i Case No. 970471-CA 
Trial Court No. 941400117 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by Wesley James Long ("Long") from the 
judgment and conviction of two counts of Child Abuse, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) 
(1993). This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A« Issues 
1. In this case involving child abuse, was counsel 
constitutionally ineffective by failing to object to the admissions 
of: 
(a) a police report indicating that Long was 
investigated (not convicted) for assaulting his ex-wife who is 
not the victim of the charged offenses? 
(b) evidence of Long's prior felony convictions 
(attempted burglary and kidnapping)? 
(c) evidence of Long's uncharged misconduct or 
"other bad acts" allegedly perpetrated on people other than 
the abused victim? 
2. Was it plain error for the trial court to admit the 
above described evidence, even though trial counsel raised no 
objection? 
3. Do cumulative evidentiary errors warrant a new 
trial? 
4. Were erroneous admissions of the evidence harmless? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying 
Long's motion for arrest of judgment and/or new trial? 
B. Standards of Appellate Review 
1. The trial court ruled on Long's ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error claims subsequent to a motion 
for new trial hearing. See R.618,621,699,1191 & Addendum IV.1 
Therefore, the ineffectiveness claim presents a mixed question of 
law and fact, such that the trial court's factual findings deserves 
some deference in this Court. However, the legal conclusions of 
the court below are reviewed de novo, for correction of error. See 
1
 The denial of the motion to arrest judgment and/or for 
new trial calls for abuse of discretion standard review. See State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). However, the underlying 
substantive claims resulting in the denial of the motion are 
reviewed as discussed below. 
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State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531, 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 30-31 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
2. (a) Admissions of the uncharged misconduct and 
prior crimes evidence call for a no-deference, correction of error 
standard of review. See State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 488-90, 
308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19-21 (Utah 1997). 
(b) The plain error analysis requires this Court to view 
the trial record as a whole to determine if the claim errors 
seriously affected the fairness of the trial. See State v. Labrum, 
925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 
& nn.7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). 
3. The harmless error standard asks this Court to 
review whether the claimed error had substantial and injurious 
effect on the jury verdict, i.e., whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome would have been different absent the 
error. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 
725, 732 (1986); State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 
1995); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
4. The issue relating to cumulative evidentiary errors 
requires this Court to consider whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable verdict absent the errors. State v. 
Rimmasch, 115 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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C. Preservation of Issues and Propriety of Review 
These issues initially were not preserved in the court 
below, as trial counsel could not have preserved their own 
ineffectiveness for appellate review. See State v. Garrett, 849 
P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993) . However, present counsel filed a motion for new trial 
(R.465) , in which the issues were raised and then ruled upon by the 
trial court. See R.618, 621, 699,1175; cf. Classon, 935 P.2d at 531, 
312 UAR at 30-31 (issue properly preserved where trial court ruled 
on ineffective claim on Rule 23B remand). 
In the alternative, this Court could apply the plain 
error doctrine to counsel's failure to preserve the foregoing 
issues. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-
12; State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules cited below, are reproduced in the following order at 
Addendum I: 
Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109; Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure Rule 30;, Utah Rules of Evidence 103, 401, 
403, 404, 607, 608, 609. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State charged Long in a two-count Information 
alleging child abuse (R.4-6). Count I alleges that between January 
20, 1990, and February 4, 1990, Long intentionally or knowingly 
inflicted serious physical injury upon WJL, a child under the age 
of 18, in that he violently shook WJL (who was then between 2 and 
4 weeks of age), resulting in serious and permanent brain damage 
and impairment of neurological function• This is a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (1993). 
Count II charges that between April and May 5, 1990, Long 
intentionally or knowingly inflicted serious physical injury upon 
WJL (who was then three months old), breaking four of WJL's ribs 
and also causing him respiratory distress, a second degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (1993) . See R.4-6. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On April 28, 1994, the State moved in limine for the 
admission of evidence of other bad acts allegedly perpetrated by 
Long (R.44-68), to which the defense objected (R.89-108). 
Thereafter, a jury trial commencing October 23, 1995, came to an 
abrupt end because of a mistrial ordered as a result of counsel's 
medical condition (R.136-140, 146). 
- 5 -
Subsequently, on February 2, 6, 7 and 8, 1996, Long 
underwent another jury trial (R.223-229), at which he was 
eventually convicted as charged (R.221-222). 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
On June 7, 1996, the district court ordered Long 
committed to the Utah State Prison for a sixty-day evaluation 
(R.460-463). Thereafter, on September 5, 1996, the court sentenced 
Long on the convictions to two concurrent, indeterminate prison 
terms of one to fifteen (1-15) years (R.578-580,1140-41).2 
Subsequently, the court denied Long's motion for a new 
trial, but granted his motion for a certificate of probable cause 
pursuant to Rule 27(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(R.700,712,1175). This appeal then followed. 
JD. Statement of the Facts 
In the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the 
evidence reveals the following:3 
2
 The judgment and commitment order is also designated 
"minute entry," which generally is not an appealable order. 
However, the judgment and commitment order and the order denying 
the motion for new trial here contain the "final" order of the 
district court. See Addenda II & IV. 
3
 See State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992) 
(requiring that appellate court review verdict evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury's decision). However, Long will 
present conflicting evidence "to the extent necessary to clarify 
the issues raised on appeal." Classon, 935 P.2d at 531, 312 UAR at 
27. 
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1. The State's Case in Chief 
a. Medical Testimony 
On the first day of trial, Dr. Marion Walker, a pediatric 
surgeon at Salt Lake Primary Children's Hospital, who had been 
asked to review WJL's medical record, testified that the injuries 
the child suffered, resulting in lasting permanent damage to his 
brain, were a result of trauma and non-accidental in nature. He 
opined that the injuries were neither prenatal nor perinatal, but 
were caused by violent shaking, popularly referred to as "Shaken 
Baby Syndrome" (R.1013-1014 [Tr.144-146]) .4 Dr. Walker said WJL's 
fractured ribs were also a result of a direct and heavy force 
applied by an adult, and could not have been caused by a fall from 
a couch (R.1009 [Tr.160]). Jumping onto a child/s chest with a 
foot or knee, Dr. Walker concluded, could be the type of force 
applied to WJL's chest that caused an injury of this nature (R.1007 
[Tr.171]). 
Dr. Thale Smith testified on the second day of trial. 
Dr. Smith had treated WJL at the time of birth in January 1990, 
when he was born prematurely and with breathing problems (R.1114 
[Tr.209]). Dr. Smith would later see WJL periodically over the 
course of the next several weeks for breathing-related problems 
(R.1113-1114 [Tr.210-212]). At one point WJL became "apnea," that 
4
 The trial transcript is paginated backward in the 
appellate record. For clarity purposes, Long will cite to the 
record as well as the original transcript pages. 
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is, stopped breathing completely because of severe brain swelling. 
Eventually, a neurosurgeon was called to drain fluid from the 
child's brain to relieve the cranial pressure (R.1113 [Tr.213-
214]). 
Dr. Smith again saw WJL in May 1990, due to the broken 
ribs injury, which he opined was caused by a sustained force or 
some sort of applied compression sufficient to break the resilience 
of the ribs. After seeing the broken ribs injury, the doctor 
opined that WJL's neurological problems must also have stemmed from 
shaken baby syndrome (R.1112 [Tr.216-217]). 
Dr. Richard Boyer, a pediatric radiologist, also 
testified for the State. Dr. Boyer had not personally treated WJL, 
but had reviewed the X-rays, CT and MRI scans conducted on the 
child (R.1109 [Tr.229-230]) . Like Dr. Walker, Dr. Boyer opined 
that WJL's neurological problems were not perinatal but a result of 
violent shaking (R.1104 [Tr.249]). He also testified that the 
broken ribs were caused by a severe force generated by squeezing or 
compression of the chest, of the type a normally muscled adult, 
male or female, could produce (R.1105 [Tr.246]). 
b. Lay Testimony 
i. The Crime 
Long's former wife, Jamie Kastenbader, testified February 
6 on behalf of the State. Ms. Kastenbader was married to Long from 
March 1988 to December 1990, during which time the couple had two 
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children: Nessia, born November 1988, and WJL, born January 1990. 
Ms. Kastenbader eventually gave up her parental rights to the two 
children in December 1991 (R.1043,1017 [Tr.26,130]). 
As to Count I, Ms. Kastenbader testified that on January 
27, 1990, Nessia and WJL were at home with Long in Springville, 
Utah, while she was doing laundry at her mother's home in Orem, 
Utah. She came home and found WJL laying in his bassinet (R.1041 
[Tr.35]). Later in the evening, Long told Ms. Kastenbader that he 
would get up at night and feed WJL because Ms. Kastenbader needed 
to rest (R.1040 [Tr.37]). 
When Ms. Kastenbader woke up the following morning, 
January 28, she saw Long standing over the bassinet. Long 
explained to Ms. Kastenbader that WJL had never woke up the 
previous night. At this point, Ms. Kastenbader checked WJL and 
observed bruising marks on his face (R.1040 [Tr.37-38]). When 
asked about the bruise, Long explained that Nessia had pulled WJL 
off the couch the previous day when Ms. Kastenbader was doing the 
laundry at her mother's house (R.1040 [Tr.38]) . WJL was then taken 
to the hospital and released by doctors after being examined 
(R.1041 [Tr.40]). 
Thereafter, according to Ms. Kastenbader, on Sunday, 
February 4, 1990, Ms. Kastenbader, Long, WJL, Nessia and Curtis — 
Long's two-year-old son from a previous relationship — were all in 
their trailer home in Springville (R.1039 [Tr.40-41]). At some 
point that day, Ms. Kastenbader began preparing dinner in the 
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kitchen, while Nessia and Curtis were playing around the house. At 
this time, Long was sitting in the living room, and beside him was 
WJL in a bassinet (R.1039 [Tr.42-43]). Approximately thirty 
minutes later, Long held WJL in his arms and said the child was not 
breathing very well (R.1039 [Tr.43]). WJL was thereafter taken to 
the hospital where he stayed for five days (R.1038 [Tr.44]). 
Regarding Count II, Ms. Kastenbader testified that on May 
4, 1990, the couple and their children were staying at the home of 
Long's parents, where they had a downstairs bedroom (R.1037 
[Tr.48]). Ms. Kastenbader, the children, and other family members 
were at home that Friday evening. Long was not home, having gone 
to work on a second shift (R.1037 [Tr.49]). Long returned home at 
night when Ms. Kastenbader and the children were getting ready to 
go to bed. At this point, Long agreed to feed WJL, so that Ms. 
Kastenbader and Nessia could sleep. 
Long then took WJL with him to watch television in the 
family room, located on the same floor. Shortly before she went to 
sleep, Ms. Kastenbader heard a "squeal or like a screech." Ms. 
Kastenbader did not see WJL until the following morning, May 5, 
when she saw red dots on his face. She also noticed that WJL's 
feeding tube had been removed, which tube normally was in his mouth 
and taped to his face (R.1037 [Tr.50J). 
WJL was then taken to the hospital. The following day, 
May 6, doctors advised Ms. Kastenbader that the child had suffered 
broken ribs (R.1036 [Tr.52]). When Ms. Kastenbader got home and 
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confronted Long about the broken ribs, Long opined, among other 
things, that WJL must have a rare bone disease (R.1036 [Tr.55]). 
ii. Other Bad Acts Evidence Admitted 
Ms. Kastenbader related to the jury that when they were 
married, Long was not a good father to Nessia, that he beat her all 
the time, pulled her ponytail, and spanked her for various little 
things the child did. Ms. Kastenbader also said Long told her 
almost every day after she became pregnant with WJL that she needed 
to get an abortion (R.1042-1043 [Tr.27-30]). One day, in December 
1989, an argument ensued between the two at Long's parents' home, 
and Long pushed her down the basement stairs, causing her to go 
into premature labor (R.1042 [Tr.29,31]). According to Ms. 
Kastenbader, though unsupported by medical opinion, WJL was thus 
born with severe lung problems (R.1041 [Tr.32-33]). 
Maggie Blackburn, Ms. Kastenbader's friend, also 
testified about the uncharged abuse perpetrated by Long on Nessia. 
Ms. Blackburn said she was present when Long pulled Nessia's hair 
and beat her. She was also there when Long pushed Ms. Kastenbader 
down the stairs (R.1001 [Tr.193-195]) . 
On cross-examination, counsel asked if Ms. Kastenbader 
had been accused in October 1990 of breaking Nessia's arm and 
inflicting on the child wounds that appeared to be cigarette burns 
(R.1017,1027 [Tr.90-91,128]). The State objected (R.1027 [Tr.91]), 
on the ground that the question called for prejudicial, 
- 11 -
inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R.1024,1025 [Tr.98,102]). 
At this point, the court sustained the objection, stating 
"we are not trying or attempting to retry any kind of a case with 
regard to Nessia. We are here with regard to the abuse of a young 
boy — W[JL] " (R.1022 [Tr.109]). Counsel then reminded the 
court that it had admitted similar other bad acts evidence against 
Long through Ms. Kastenbader's testimony that Long was abusive of 
Nessia. The court responded that counsel posited no objection to 
Ms. Kastenbader's prejudicial, objectionable testimony (R.1022 
[Tr.109]). 
2. The Defense 
Long testified on his own behalf on the second day of 
trial. He denied ever having abused any of his children, or pushed 
Ms. Kastenbader down the stairs during her pregnancy (R.1100 
[Tr.263]). Regarding the allegation relating to brain damage, Long 
explained that on January 27, 1990, while with Nessia in the 
kitchen preparing her bottle, he discovered that the girl had left 
and had gone into the living room where WJL had been sleeping on a 
couch. When he went to the living room, he found that WJL had been 
pulled off the couch. He did not see any bruises on WJL at the 
time (R.1099-1100 [Tr.265-270]) . 
Long further testified he had gone on a construction job 
with his father on February 4, 1990, after dropping Curtis off at 
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his (Long's) parents7 home. He returned to his parents7 home 
around 4:30 p.m., picked up Curtis, and went to his house in 
Springville around 5:00 p.m. (R.1098-1099 [Tr.270-272]). When he 
got home, Ms Kastenbader advised that WJL was not "acting right.11 
He then picked WJL up and observed he was turning blue and 
unconscious. He tried to administer CPR on WJL until the ambulance 
arrived and took the child to the hospital (R.1098 [Tr.273-274]). 
On the fractured ribs allegation, Long testified that the 
couple and the children moved to his parents7 home in March 1990 
(R.1097 [Tr.278]). Thereafter, he began working as a crane 
operator at Intermountain Galvanizing in Lindon, Utah, working the 
second shift from 4:00 p.m. to midnight. On May 5, Long finished 
his shift around 12:24 a.m., and returned home around 1:15 a.m. 
(R.1096 [Tr.281]). Upon returning, Long observed that everybody in 
the house was asleep (R.1093 [Tr.294]). He then fell asleep, only 
to be awaken around 8:00 a.m. by Ms. Kastenbader, who related that 
WJL had little red dots on his face (R.1095 [Tr.284]). 
Long further explained that he did not tell Ms. 
Kastenbader on January 28 that WJL had been pulled off the couch by 
Nessia, because he Mdidn7t think it was that big of a thing," and 
also because the child seemed fine at the time (R.1092 [Tr.298]). 
On cross-examination, the State asked whether Long had 
been convicted of felonies (R.1093 [Tr.294]). Long responded that 
he was convicted in 1992 of attempted burglary and kidnapping 
(R.1093 [Tr.294])o Defense counsel then objected when the State 
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asked whether the felonies were related offenses, which objection 
the court sustained (R.1092 [Tr.295]). 
3. Rebuttal Evidence 
Because Long denied beating his ex-wife, or pushing her 
down the stairs during her pregnancy, the State offered as rebuttal 
evidence, and defense counsel stipulated to the foundational 
element of admitting, a 1988 police report indicating that Long was 
investigated (not convicted) for assaulting Ms. Kastenbader (R.1134 
[Tr.408-409]). Without any objection, the police report was 
thereafter admitted by the court (R.1134 [Tr.410]). 
In its closing argument, the State alluded to the police 
report as substantive evidence of Long's guilt, or at least vouched 
for Ms. Kastenbader's credibility, stating, "[the report], I think, 
helps you to decide which of these people is telling the truth..." 
(R.1131 [Tr.420]). 
4. Other Defense Witnesses 
Dr. Kevin Gully, a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
testified for the defense (R.1087 [Tr.318]). Dr. Gully had been 
appointed in 1991 by Judge Brown, in the juvenile court 
proceedings, to file a report on whether Long and Ms. Kastenbader 
had been abusing Nessia (R.1087,1082 Tr.318,336). Thereafter, Dr. 
Gully spoke with Ms. Kastenbader in January 1992 over the telephone 
concerning the abuse allegation. At the time, Ms. Kastenbader told 
Dr. Gully that Long had never hurt Nessia, and the worst punishment 
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he had ever inflicted was to "make her cry to sleep and slap her 
hand telling her 'no'" (R.1086 [Tr.321-322]) . Continued Dr. Gully, 
Ms. Kastenbader also told him that her friend, Ms. Blackburn, was 
"two-faced" and will do anything if offered money (R.1085 
[Tr.323]). 
Long's mother, Linda Long, testified that Ms. Kastenbader 
asked her to tend WJL on May 4, 1990. Mrs. Long said she declined 
to do so because she was tired. She then saw WJL's head propped up 
on the couch, and thereafter observed Ms. Kastenbader sit on the 
child (R.1080 [Tr.346]). She also corroborated the testimony that 
Long brought Curtis over to the elder Long's home on February 4, 
and then went to work with his father (R.1079 [Tr.348]). 
Mark Stringer, who had been appointed guardian ad litem 
for WJL and Nessia, related how Ms. Kastenbader had moved out of 
Utah, showed no interest in WJL, and maintained no contact with the 
child after the abuse allegations surfaced in the juvenile court. 
He testified that Long, however, remained locally and maintained 
contact with the child (R.1075 [Tr.363]). 
Mr. Stringer said he spoke to Ms. Kastenbader about the 
abuse allegations on November 13, 1990. At this time, Ms. 
Kastenbader said her mother, Pam Rasmussen, had been abusive to her 
and may have also abused Nessia (R.1074 [Tr.369]). Because Long 
and Ms. Kastenbader seemed puzzled about how WJL could have been 
severely injured, Mr. Stringer said he told them they would never 
know who abused the child (R.1073 [Tr.374]). 
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Roselyn Blakelock, another guardian ad litem who had 
assisted Mr. Stringer, testified that Ms, Kastenbader told her on 
July 31, 1990, that her premature labor must have been caused by 
the fright of seeing a boa constrictor in her cupboard, and was not 
a result of a fall or push (R.1067-1068 [Tr.392-395]). She also 
said Ms. Kastenbader made numerous inconsistent statements about 
what could have caused WJL's injuries (R.1067 [Tr.395]). Long, on 
the other hand, gave consistent statements as to possible cause of 
the injuries (R.1067 [Tr.396]). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
admissions of evidence relating to a police report of an assault 
investigation, prior convictions, and other uncharged misconduct 
evidence. Given that the State's case was premised solely on 
circumstantial evidence, the credibility of Long and Ms. 
Kastenbader was of utmost importance to the jury. Long, however, 
was prejudiced by the cumulative admissions of the evidence, as the 
inadmissible evidence unfavorably tipped the balance against him. 
The trial court should have noticed counsel's error in 
not objecting to the admissions of the highly damaging evidence. 
It should have been obvious, with relation to plain error, to the 
court that counsel's failure to object to the other crimes evidence 
was erroneous and prejudicial. 
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Further, the errors complained of were harmful and 
prejudicial. Absent the cumulative errors, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a different outcome, because the State's case was 
premised solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Long's ex-wife, 
who was discredited by neutral witnesses and who had the 
opportunity and motive to commit the charged offenses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. LONG WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN 
COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF A POLICE 
REPORT OF AN ALLEGED ASSAULT OF HIS EX-WIFE WHO IS NOT 
THE VICTIM OF THE CHARGED CRIME. 
A. .Relevant Facts 
On cross-examination, Long denied beating his ex-wife or 
pushing her down the stairs during her pregnancy. In "rebuttal," 
the State offered, and defense counsel stipulated to the 
foundational elements of admitting, a 1988 police report indicating 
that Long was investigated (not convicted) for assaulting Ms. 
Kastenbader. The police report was then admitted into evidence by 
the court without any objection, and used by the prosecutor in his 
closing argument as substantive evidence of Long's guilt. 
B. Standard of Review 
To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a defendant must show that (i) counsel's 
performance was deficient in some demonstrable manner so 
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (ii) there is a reasonable 
probability that but for the ineffective assistance, the 
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result in the proceeding would have been more favorable 
to the defendant. 
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553f 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).5 
C. Counsel's Performance and Prejudice to Long 
The police report of an investigation of Long in 1988 for 
assaulting his ex-wife is clearly irrelevant and inadmissible on 
the question whether Long abused WJL. See Utah R. Evid. 401 & 402; 
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1983). 
The State's theory presumably is that the evidence was 
offered to impeach Long under Rule 607, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
However, the credibility of a witness may be attacked only "by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, subject to [other] 
limitations." Utah R. Evid. 608(a). Rule 608(b) goes on to state, 
with emphasis added: 
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the 
purposes of attacking or supporting the witness' 
credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided 
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
Thus, undoubtedly, the police report which did not result in Long's 
conviction was inadmissible under Rule 608.6 
5
 See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 427; State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); Classon, 935 P.2d at 531, 
312 UAR at 31; State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . 
6
 State v. Starks, 581 P. 2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1978) ("The 
better reasoned cases hold that conduct where no conviction is had 
is not admissible to impeach a witness."). 
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Moreover, the police report is also inadmissible under 
Rules 404 and 403.7 Indeed, such evidence is presumptively 
prejudicial because of the jury's tendency to convict the accused 
on the basis of perceived criminal character.8 
The Utah Supreme Court recently regraded the landscape of 
the admissibility of prior crimes evidence. In State v. Doporto, 
935 P.2d 484, 490, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (S. Ct. 1997), the 
court held: 
Prior crime evidence has inherent and unavoidable 
inflammatory potential. Hence, the general rule stated 
in the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is that prior crimes 
evidence is inadmissible unless it has a special 
relevance to the crimes charged by being probative of 
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
To assure the integrity of the trial process, we hold 
that evidence of prior crimes is presumed to be 
inadmissible and that, prior to admitting it, the trial 
court must find that (1) there is a necessity for the 
prior crimes evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a 
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its special 
probativeness and the necessity for it outweighs its 
7
 Utah R.Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent..."); Utah R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury . . . " ) . 
8
 See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 486, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22 
(other bad acts witnesses' testimony was of no probative value as 
to defendant's intent or motive in assaulting victim, nor was 
testimony probative of defendant's common plan or scheme). Accord 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989); State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982); State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978); 
State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977); Starks, 581 P.2d at 
1017-18. 
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prejudicial effect. As stated above, we will review the 
trial court's rulings on these issues more closely than 
ordinary rulings on relevance and with a limited 
deference (emphasis added).9 
In Doporto, the defendant allegedly sodomized A.W. when 
the girl was seven years old. Prior to trial, the State moved in 
limine, under Rule 404(b), to allow six other persons to testify 
that the defendant had also sexually abused them on other 
occasions. According to the State, the witnesses' testimony was 
probative of the defendant's intent, opportunity, and common scheme 
or plan. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court allowed 
the State to present any two of the four witnesses which the court 
deemed their testimony to be probative and not prejudicial. See 
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 486, 308 UAR at 19. 
A.W., the victim of the charged crime, testified that the 
defendant rubbed baby lotion on the inside of her legs and then 
anally sodomized her, when she had a sleep-over at the defendant's 
house. In addition, B.J.L., one of the two witnesses the State had 
selected pursuant to the trial court's order, testified that she 
went over to the defendant's house when she was eleven years old to 
visit one of his daughters. The daughter was not home, but the 
defendant invited her to go driving. The defendant then took her 
to a remote location where he removed her clothing and then had 
9
 The court went on to state that necessity entails proving 
an issue contested by the accused, and "probativeness" cannot be 
used as a ruse for showing that the accused has criminal 
propensities. See id., 935 P.2d at 490, 308 UAR at 22. 
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sexual intercourse with her. See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 486-87, 308 
UAR at 19-20. 
T.M., defendant's niece and the State's second other bad 
acts witness, testified to two prior incidents of sexual abuse. 
When she was five years old, T.M. attended a family gathering at 
the defendant's home, where she was instructed by the defendant's 
wife to go with the defendant and that he would give her a bath. 
She said the defendant rubbed baby oil on her and then had 
intercourse with her. She also related another incident which 
occurred when she was fourteen years old. This time, at another 
family gathering, the defendant came into the room where T.M. was 
watching television, gave her five dollars, and unzipped her pants. 
He then attempted to kiss and touch her vagina. See Doporto, 935 
P.2d at 487-88, 308 UAR at 19-20. 
On appeal, the supreme court concluded that B.J.L.'s and 
T.M.'s testimony was not probative of the defendant's intent or 
motive for sodomizing A.W. See id., 935 P. 2d at 493, 30 UAR at 22. 
Nor was the testimony probative of opportunity to commit the 
charged crime since the fact was not disputed. See id. The court 
went on to conclude that the State had not demonstrated any common 
scheme or plan, because the similarity between the charged and 
uncharged crimes is so common to many assault and rape cases, such 
that it is not peculiarly distinctive. "In short, the real weight 
of the prior crimes evidence went to showing a propensity to acts 
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of child abuse rather than showing that Doporto committed the act 
charged." Id., 935 P.2d at 493, 30 UAR at 22. 
The court further concluded that, even if the other bad 
acts had any probative value, the trial court erred in admitting 
the evidence under Rule 403, on the ground that the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its 
probativeness. The supreme court noted that the prejudicial nature 
of the evidence "was severe and readily apparent," and thus "far 
outweighed its legitimate probative value, if any, that it had." 
See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 23-24. 
Here, too, the police report of Long's alleged assault of 
Ms. Kastenbader is not necessary, nor probative of his intent or 
motive for injuring WJL. In addition, the prosecutor's reference 
in his closing argument to the police report as evidence of Long's 
character (or lack thereof) , and the bolstering of Ms. 
Kastenbader's credibility further highlights the problem with its 
admission.10 
In our adversary system, it is the responsibility of 
defense counsel to object to the admission of prejudicial evidence 
against his client.11 Here, counsel failed to object to the 
10
 See generally State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 
1992) (prosecutorial comment on defendant's prior conviction tilted 
balance in favor of conviction where credibility was an issue). 
11
 See Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 103.9 (2d ed. 
1986 & Supp. 1996) ("Graham"); Weinstein et al., Evidence 96 (8th 
ed. 1988); Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Foundations 7, 10 (1986). 
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admission of the prejudicial, inadmissible police report. Under the 
Strickland standard, counsel's performance was clearly deficient.12 
See State v. Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 867 (Idaho 1990); State v. 
Hallett, 796 P. 2d 701, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (counsel's 
performance deficient in failing to object to admission of hearsay 
evidence), aff'd., 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).13 Long, however, is 
aware of this Court's long-held presumption that counsel's conduct 
might be considered sound trial strategy even if counsel's action 
is patently unwise.14 
In Julian, as here, the defendant contended that his 
counsel failed to file a motion in limine and to object to 
presentation of evidence of other wrongful conduct on the part of 
the defendant. However, after reviewing the record, the supreme 
court concluded that: 
12
 The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for 
determining the responsibilities of defense counsel...." Marzullo 
v. State of Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA 
Standard Relating to Defense Function provides that a lawyer should 
follow proper procedures, entering appropriate motions and 
objections to protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, "The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & 
Supp. 1986). 
13
 But see State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) 
(quoted case omitted) ("'Decisions as to what objections to make 
... are generally left to the professional judgment of counsel'"); 
State v. Julian, 111 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989) (same). 
14
 See, e.g. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) ("[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when 
no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from 
counsel's actions."). 
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counsel made a conscious decision to allow introduction 
of the testimony in question in order to demonstrate the 
theory that defendant's wife had abnormal reactions to 
and preoccupation with sexual matters, which explained a 
poor marital relationship, and led to manipulate and 
corrupt the children and cause the fabrication of their 
testimony. While counsel conceivably took a risk by 
allowing discussion of defendant's relationship with his 
wife, including their "sexual problems,11 defendant cannot 
now complain that the defense was ineffective because it 
was unsuccessful. 
Julian, 111 P.2d at 1064 (footnote omitted).15 
The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable 
from Julian and its progeny. Here, Long maintained his innocence 
throughout the investigatory stages and at trial. He also denied 
ever assaulting his ex-wife, Ms. Kastenbader, which testimony was 
directly contradicted by Ms. Kastenbader. Thus, credibility before 
the jury was of paramount concern because of the conflicting 
testimony.16 Accordingly, there was no trial strategy upon which 
counsel's failure to preclude the admission of the police report, 
which did not result in a conviction, could be predicated, 
"particularly in the instant case, where [Long]'s character is at 
the heart of his defense." Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. 
Under Doporto, the police report was unnecessary and not 
probative of any element of the charged crime. Accordingly, 
15
 See also State v. Grueber, 116 P. 2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct. 
App.) (counsel's strategy of eliciting from defendant his prior 
convictions did not render counsel's performance deficient or 
defendant prejudiced), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
16
 See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785-86; Doporto, 935 P.2d at 494, 
308 UAR at 24. 
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admission of such evidence was clearly prejudicial to Long,17 since 
it made him appear to be a prevaricator, and therefore more 
inclined to commit the alleged offense. The jury could have 
reached a different verdict absent the highly prejudicial evidence 
and counsels ineffectiveness in precluding its admission.18 
Therefore, Long urges this Court to reverse his conviction and 
order a new trial.19 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE BY 
NOT OBJECTING TO PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO LONG'S 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
A. Relevant Facts 
On cross-examination, the State asked whether Long had 
been convicted of felonies. Long responded that he was convicted 
of attempted burglary and kidnapping in 1992. Defense counsel then 
objected when the State asked whether the felonies were related 
offenses, which objection the court sustained. 
B. Counsel's Performance and Prejudice to Long 
Rule 609 governing the admission of prior convictions 
provides: 
17
 See State v. Gentry, 747 P. 2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
18
 See Emmett, 839 P. 2d at 786; cf. Doporto, 935 P. 2d at 
494, 308 UAR at 24 (result might have been different absent 
admission of inadmissible other bad acts). 
19
 See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 
1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (if the "taint" caused by inadmissible 
evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient 
untainted evidence to support a verdict"). 
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(a) General rule: For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject 
to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year . . ., and evidence that 
an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be 
admitted if the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of 
a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
Utah R. Evid. 609. 
Character evidence generally is inadmissible to prove 
that a person acted in conformity therewith during a particular 
occasion. See Utah R.Evid. 404(a); Doporto, 935 P.2d at 490, 308 
UAR at 21-22. Nor are other crimes or prior convictions admissible 
evidence of conformity under Rule 404.20 Even for a testifying 
defendant, for whom Rule 609 does not forbid all use of convictions 
to impeach, the rule requires that the State show that the 
probative value of convictions as impeachment evidence outweighs 
their prejudicial effects.21 
20
 See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Doporto, 935 P. 2d at 491, 308 UAR at 21-22. Because Utah's 
evidentiary rules are similar to their federal counterparts, 
federal interpretations of their rules remain persuasive. State v. 
Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 926 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994;, overruled on 
other grds, Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489-90; Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 
806 P.2d 235, 237 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
21
 See Fed.R.Evid. 609 advisory committee's note ("1990 
Amendment") (cited also in 3 Weinstein's Evidence §609-01, at 609-3 
(1991)). Accord United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 353 n.l 
(1st Cir. 1981). 
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Here, subsection 609(a)(2) clearly is inapplicable, for 
Long's prior convictions for attempted burglary and kidnapping do 
not involve dishonesty or falsity.22 Even under subsection 
609(a)(1), evidence of prior conviction is admissible against a 
testifying defendant only after the trial court conducts the 
necessary balancing test indicating that the probative value of 
such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect,23 Phrased 
differently, prior crimes evidence is presumptively prejudicial and 
inadmissible absent a showing that it is more probative than 
prejudicial.24 
Here, defense counsel failed to object to the admission 
of this highly damaging evidence. Under the Strickland standard, 
22
 See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) (attempted 
burglary conviction not probative of truthfulness). Cf. State v. 
Brown, 111 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (theft not necessarily a 
crime involving dishonesty). 
23
 See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1); Holtman, 806 P.2d at 238 
(balancing test prerequisite to admissibility of prior convictions; 
the trial court erred in not conducting balancing test). 
24
 Id.; State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, (Utah 1985), 
limited on other grds, Doporto, 935 P.2d at 490-91; State v. 
Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986); Gentry, 141 P.2d at 1032. 
It is telling that the State filed no in limine motion to 
admit the prior convictions, even though the State filed a motion 
for admitting other uncharged crimes. For the reasons discussed 
above in Point I (A) , the prior convictions evidence would have 
been inadmissible under Rule 404, because they were neither 
necessary nor probative of Long's intent in committing the charged 
crime. 
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counsel's performance was clearly deficient.25 See Walters, 813 
P. 2d at 867; Hallett, 796 P. 2d at 705 (counsel's performance 
deficient in failing to object to admission of hearsay evidence). 
No reasonable trial strategy dictates counsel allowing felony 
convictions to be admitted against his client without objecting and 
therefore mandating the balancing test, as clearly required Rule 
609. See Holtman, 806 P.2d at 238. This is especially true in the 
instant case, which is premised solely on circumstantial evidence, 
where Long's character/credibility becomes his only defense. See 
id. at 239. 
Further, Long suffered prejudice as a result of admitting 
the prior convictions evidence. Again, the instant case, which by 
the State's own admission, was premised solely on circumstantial 
evidence (R.1132 [Tr.417]), hinges significantly on whether the 
jury finds Long or Ms. Kastenbader more believable.26 The prior 
crimes evidence, coupled with the police report of an assault 
allegation, simply provided the jury a reason "to convict [Long] 
25
 The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for 
determining the responsibilities of defense counsel...." Marzullo 
v. State of Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA 
Standard Relating to Defense Function provides that a lawyer should 
follow proper procedures, entering appropriate motions and 
objections to protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, "The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & 
Supp. 1986). 
26
 See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; of. Doporto, 935 P.2d at 
494, 308 UAR at 24 (case hinges on whether jury found defendant or 
victim more believable). 
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because of bad character rather than because he is shown to be 
guilty of the offenses charged."27 
C. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS PERPETRATED ON PEOPLE OTHER 
THAN THE VICTIM CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
A. Relevant Facts 
The State charged Long with abusing his son, WJL. 
However, two State witnesses, Ms. Kastenbader and Ms. Blackburn, 
testified that Long had also been abusive to his daughter, Nessia. 
The witnesses also alluded to Long pushing Ms. Kastenbader down the 
stairs while she was pregnant. Defense counsel made no objection 
to the admission of this evidence. On cross-examination, defense 
counsel asked whether Ms. Kastenbader had also been abusive to 
Nessia. The prosecutor's objection to this question was, however, 
sustained by the court. At this point, the court reminded defense 
counsel that he had not made any objection to similar inadmissible 
other bad acts admitted against Long. 
27
 Saunders, 699 P. 2d at 741. Accord Doporto, 935 P.2d at 
493, 308 UAR at 22; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; Uoltman, 806 P.2d at 
239. 
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B. Counsel's Performance and Prejudice to Long 
Several evidentiary rules are called into play in 
determining the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.28 
Rule 404(b) provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity , or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 401 provides that f,/Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. 
Evid. 401. Rule 403 in turn states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading 
the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
28 See generally Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 
690-91, 108 S. Ct. 1496-1501-02 (1988) (discussing relevant 
evidentiary rules); Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 
2.06 (1984). See also Doporto, 935 P.2d at 490-494; State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426-27 (Utah 1989), as limited by 
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489. 
Utah courts look to the interpretation of complimentary 
federal evidentiary rules, see State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 
n.6 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993), as 
limited by Doporto, 935 P.2d at 484, but are not bound by federal 
interpretation, see State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1265-67 (Utah 
1993). 
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In considering admissibility of other acts evidence, the 
Utah appellate courts have instructed the trial courts to first 
determine whether the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). 
The trial court must then carefully consider whether the admission 
of the evidence will amount to prejudicial error under Rule 403.29 
In addition, the courts have warned of extra-ordinary caution in 
admitting other bad acts evidence, stating for example, "We do not 
doubt that ' evidence of prior convictions and other bad acts has 
tremendous potential to sway the finder of fact unfairly' and 
increases the likelihood of conviction."30 Recently, the supreme 
court held that evidence of other crimes perpetrated by the 
defendant on people other than the victim should not have been 
admitted against the defendant because the evidence was unnecessary 
and not probative of elements of the charged crime. See Doporto, 
935 P.2d at 490-494, 308 UAR at 22-24. 
Here, the trial court allowed the State to present 
uncharged misconduct evidence relating to the "statements made by 
the defendant to Jamie Conder Kastenbader during the pregnancy, the 
victim supposedly falling off the couch, and ... the defendant 
29
 See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489-90. See also People v. 
Alcala, 685 P.2d 1126, 1140-41 (Cal. 1984) (other bad acts evidence 
must be "examined with care."), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 215 
(1993) . 
30
 State v. Florez, 111 P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Gardner, 789 P.2d at 289 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Accord 
Alcala, 685 P.2d at 1141. 
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shaking and spanking Nessia, and pulling her hair." R.140.31 
Presumably, the court allowed the other acts evidence under Rule 
404(b) to show Long's intent and/or absence of mistake or accident. 
See R.109. 
First, evidence relating to Long pushing Ms. Kastenbader 
was of no probative value regarding his intent in abusing WJL. See 
Doporto, 935 P. 2d at 491, 308 UAR at 22. Second, that Long may 
have told Ms. Kastenbader during her pregnancy to get an abortion 
is not indicative of his intent to injure WJL. See id. Third, 
"intent" and/or "absence of mistake or accident" were not in issue, 
because uncontroverted medical evidence readily established that 
WJL's injuries were intentionally inflicted and not a result of 
mistake or accident. See R.1009. Accordingly, the trial court's 
decision to admit the evidence was erroneous, because the other bad 
acts evidence was unnecessary and not probative of any controverted 
element. See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 491-492, 308 UAR at 22. 
Moreover, the State and the trial court have not only 
"fallen into the common error of equating acts and circumstances 
which are similar in nature with the more narrow common scheme or 
plan,"32 but have indeed equated oranges with bananas. That Long 
31
 R.140, Addendum III, is the trial court's minute entry 
regarding admission of other bad acts. Because there was no 
testimony that Long shook Nessia, no prejudicial error flowed from 
the court's decision regarding that evidence. 
32
 Doporto, 935 P.2d at 491, 3 08 UAR at 22 (quoted case 
omitted). 
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may have spanked Nessia and pulled her is not sufficiently similar 
an act to the brain and fractured ribs injuries WJL sustained, as 
to demonstrate absence of mistake or accident, or common plan or 
scheme. See Doporto. 
Counsels failure to object to the other bad acts 
evidence constitutes deficient performance. Indeed the trial court 
encapsulates the prejudice attaching to the admission of such 
evidence, when it sustained the State's objection to similar 
evidence offered against Ms. Kastenbader: 
Well, I didn't think Teuscher33 allowed that kind of 
inquiry, and I think we are going far beyond the rules of 
evidence to allow [other bad acts] with regard to this 
particular case. We are not trying or attempting to 
retry any kind of a case with regard to Nessia. We are 
here with regard to the abuse of a young boy.... 
R.1022 [Tr. at 109]. It appears from the court's pronouncement 
that, had similar objection from the defense been forthcoming, the 
court would have granted a motion in limine, or at the minimum 
perform the necessary balancing test required by Rule 403 before 
admitting other bad acts evidence against Long.34 Because the 
33
 State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
abrogated by State v. Doporto, 935 P. 2d 484, 308 UAR 18 (S. Ct. 
1997) . 
34
 In fairness to counsel, the admissibility of other acts 
evidence had previously been litigated by the parties in the 
mistried case. See R.1022 [Tr. at 109] ("The prior trial [sic] we 
went through the whole thing, and the court ruled against us.M). 
However, the prudent course was for counsel to renew the motion at 
the retrial to afford the court the opportunity to correct its own 
error, as the court obviously did when it precluded the admission 
of other acts evidence against Ms. Kastenbader. See State v. 
Willard, 801 P.2d 189, 190 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing cases 
- 33 -
error in admitting the other bad acts evidence was obvious to the 
trial court it should also have been obvious to counsel, "who 
should have raised an appropriate objection."35 
Counsel's performance was deficient for not objecting to 
the admission of other acts evidence relating to Nessia. The 
deficient performance was further compounded by the admission of 
evidence that Long pushed Ms. Kastenbader while she was pregnant. 
Such evidence clearly was irrelevant, and introduced solely to 
present Long to the jury as a bad person. See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 
492-93, 308 UAR at 22. 
In Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 922, referred to at trial by the 
parties and the court, a panel of this Court held that incidents of 
abuse against other children was admissible to show the identity of 
the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime in which a child was 
killed. Teuscher, however, contains no analysis of the 
similarities and dissimilarities between the charged and uncharged 
conduct to determine if the crimes constitute the defendant's 
signature. See id. at 926.36 In addition, Teuscher had been 
(fn. 34, cont'd) 
for the proposition that pretrial rulings are not binding on the 
trial court in all circumstances; trial court can and should strive 
to correct error if properly notified). 
35
 State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah Ct. App.), 
overruled on other grds., State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 
1996). 
36
 Contra Doporto, 935 P. 2d at 492-93, 308 UAR at 22 
(finding inadmissible evidence of abuse perpetrated by defendant 
against witnesses other than victim because alleged other crimes 
not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's "signature"). 
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uniformly criticized by commentators as a case that defies Utah 
supreme court precedent,37 and, as discussed above, it appears that 
Teuscher is now sub silentio overruled by Doporto. See 935 P.2d at 
489-493, 1997 WL 14805.38 
Even assuming that other bad acts were admissible under 
Rule 404(b), the evidence should have been subjected to the Rule 
?7 See, e.g., Pendleton, State v. Teuscher: The "Exception" 
Swallows the Rule, 8 Utah B.J. 13 (Oct. 1995). 
?8 State v. Winget, 6 Utah 2d 243, 310 P.2d 738 (1957), is 
undoubtedly one of Utah's leading cases on the admissibility of 
other bad acts evidence. In Winget, the Supreme Court in a rape 
prosecution held that evidence of prior nonconsensual sexual acts 
of defendant with people other than the victim is inadmissible to 
show common plan or scheme. The Winget Court cited its earlier 
decision in State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 P. 250 (1909), 
which involved a similar issue, as a case which "has been cited 
with approval by respectable authority, and represents the majority 
view." Id. at 739 (footnotes omitted). See also Featherson, 781 
P.2d at 429. 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), echoes the 
Supreme Court's caution in Doporto, Winget and Featherson, that the 
theory of common plan be strictly scrutinized to ensure that 
inadmissible evidence is not admitted under the rubric of common 
plan. Cox, like Winget and Featherson, involved a defendant who 
was convicted of rape. After charges were filed in 1987 against 
the defendant on the relevant crime, two other women stepped 
forward and reported that defendant had also raped them in 1985. 
On the theory that the evidence would show intent, common plan and 
knowledge, all three women were allowed to testify. Id. at 5-6. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court 
erroneously admitted evidence of other uncharged sexual assaults. 
This Court agreed, holding that evidence of nonconsensual sexual 
acts with victim and two other women was inadmissible because the 
similarities are too common to may rape cases so as to constitute 
a signature or modus operandi. See id. at 6. Additionally, the 
court found the evidence inadmissable because the other bad acts, 
allegedly committed two years earlier, were too remote to be 
probative. See id. 
Teuscher clearly defies these cases, which require the trial 
court to analyze the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
charged and uncharged crimes. 
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403 test.39 In applying Rule 403's balancing test, a court 
considers "the similarities between the crimes, the interval of 
time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to 
which the evidence will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility."40 
As discussed above, there were no similarities between 
the charged crime and the other bad acts. The time interval 
between them was not close. Further, the other acts evidence was 
unnecessary and not probative of Long's intent in abusing WJL. 
Moreover, the State had alternative methods of demonstrating that 
the perpetrator of the charged offense did so with the requisite 
statutory state of mind. And, of course, there is no question that 
the jury employed the other acts as evidence of Long's guilt in the 
charged crime. As such, the other acts could only have been 
39
 See Cox, 787 P. 2d at 5; see also Florez, 111 P. 2d at 459 
(other bad acts evidence "has tremendous potential to sway the 
finder of fact unfairly"). Justice Cardozo once wrote that other 
bad acts evidence can be a "peril to the innocent." People v. 
Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930). 
40
 State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) {quoting 
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984), as 
limited by Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489. See also State v. Morrell, 
803 P.2d 292, 293-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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proffered to "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility,"41 that 
Long was a "bad man" and hence guilty as charged,42 
This evidence clearly undermined Long's credibility 
before the jury, and impermissibly bolstered Ms. Kastenbader's. As 
the supreme court found in Doporto: 
The jury had to assess Doporto's and A.W.'s credibility 
and decide whether it believed beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the victim was telling the truth. The jury could 
have concluded that she was telling the truth without the 
prior crime evidence, but we are wholly unable to 
conclude that the jury was uninfluenced by that evidence 
in assessing defendant's and the victim's credibility. 
We cannot say with any assurance that absent the 
erroneous admission of he evidence of the prior crime 
evidence, the result would have been the same. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 24. Accordingly, Long urges 
this Court to reverse his conviction and order a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE THE PLAIN ERROR IN ADMITTING 
THE EVIDENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHICH FAILURE AFFECTED 
LONG'S RIGHT. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) states: 
Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court. 
41
 Shickles, 760 P. 2d at 295; Doporto, 935 P. 2d at 493. 
42
 See, e.g., State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 
1986) (use of other bad acts to show accused's criminal propensity 
tends to improperly influence the jury); Cox, 787 P.2d at 6 (same). 
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"Plain error" requires that the error be obvious to the trial court 
and that the error affect the substantial rights of the accused.43 
It should have been obvious to the trial court that evidence 
relating to Long's other bad acts, previous convictions, and police 
investigation that did not result in a conviction, was prejudicial 
and inadmissible. 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), is 
particularly instructive. In Emmett, the defendant was charged 
with sodomy upon his five-year-old son. On direct examination, the 
defendant admitted having committed a forgery in which the victim 
was his sister. In his closing argument, the prosecutor alluded to 
the forgery conviction, stating that the defendant had taken 
advantage of his sister and has now taken advantage of his son. 
The defendant's counsel, however, failed to make a timely objection 
to the comment. See 839 P. 2d at 785. In addition, there was 
conflicting testimony between the defendant and his wife on 
critical issues. Accordingly, credibility became very important. 
See id. The defendant eventually was convicted, apparently because 
the jury believed he did not testify truthfully. See id. at 786. 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, noting first that 
evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible under Rules 404 and 
609 as substantive evidence of guilt. That defense counsel failed 
to object to the comment, the court continued, should not have 
43
 Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; State 
v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991). 
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precluded the trial court from noticing this obviously plain error. 
See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785-86. The court noticed that, because 
the case was rather close due to the circumstantial nature of the 
State's evidence, the substantive use of the prior conviction must 
have tilted the balance in favor of conviction, "particularly ... 
where [the defendant]'s character is at the heart of his defense." 
Id. at 786. Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial. See id. 
at 787; see also Doporto, 935 P.2d at 494-95, 308 UAR at 22-24. 
As previously argued, evidence of other bad acts, prior 
convictions and a police report of an assault which did not result 
in a conviction was inadmissible. The evidence violated Rules 404 
and 609" because "they clearly urged the jury to view [Long] as a 
person who commits crimes against his family and to use this 
characteristic as evidence that [Long abused] his son." Emmett, 
839 P.2d at 786. As also discussed above, except for the aberrant 
Teuscher, numerous cases from this Court and the supreme court have 
held that other bad acts evidence of this nature is inadmissible. 
Accordingly, it should have been obvious to the trial court that 
the jury was being tainted by inadmissible evidence. 
As will be demonstrated in detail below in POINT III, the 
admission of the evidence was harmful and prejudicial. Like 
Emmettf the State's case against Long was purely circumstantial, 
and there was conflicting testimony regarding the perpetrator of 
the charged offenses. Because the case was a close one in light of 
the contradictory testimony, the inadmissible character evidence 
- 39 -
simply tilted the balance unfavorably against Long. See Emmett, 
839 P.2d at 786. 
POINT III 
ERRONEOUS ADMISSIONS OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED EVIDENCE WERE 
HARMFUL AND AFFECTED LONG'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS.44 
Erroneous admissions against Long of the police report of 
an assault investigation, prior convictions, and other bad acts 
derived from an evidentiary rule, rather than a constitutional, 
violation.45 A trial court is regarded as having committed a 
reversible, non-constitutional error in admitting evidence if a 
substantial right of the accused has been abridged.46 "A 
substantial right is affected by error that had a /material effect7 
or 'substantially swayed' the deliberations of the jury. Error not 
44
 Ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error claims 
generally trail each other. See Labrum, 881 P.2d at 906, vacated 
on other grds., 925 P. 2d at 937. For both claims the defendant 
must demonstrate prejudice by showing that absent counsel or trial 
court's claimed error the result of his trial would have been 
different. See id.; Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939; Villarreal, 889 P.2d 
at 427. 
45
 See United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1454 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992); Villarreal, 889 P.2d 
at 425-26. 
46
 See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Kotteakos 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-65 (1946); United States v. 
Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
884 (1991); Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425; State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed.R.Civ.P. 
61; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
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affecting a substantial right is often characterized as harmless." 
Graham, § 103.1, at 5-10 (citing cases).47 
,fNormally, the government bears the burden of proving 
that a non-constitutional error was harmless."48 Further, 
where an error does not impact a federal constitutional 
right, the test used for determining an error's 
harmfulness is whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error a different result would have 
occurred. This determination should be made on the basis 
of the record as a whole.... [T]he determination is best 
made by viewing the error in conjunction with other 
errors which occurred during the trial. 
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 784-785; accord Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425. 
Here, the question is whether the wrongful admissions of 
the challenged evidence affected Long's substantial rights. 
Phrased another way, did the admission of the police report of an 
assault investigation, prior convictions and other bad acts 
evidence substantially sway the jury deliberation? Although the 
State bears the burden of proving harmlessness,49 Long will marshal 
47
 A "reversible error" or "prejudicial error" is a non-
harmless error. See Graham, § 103.1, at 10 n.9. See generally 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (discussing harmless 
error); United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 186 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785 & n.10. 
48
 Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1255 n.15; accord United States v. 
Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 
604 (1991). 
49 See Jefferson, 925 F*2d at 1225 n. 15, 
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the evidence to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
deficient performance and/or the trial court's plain error.50 
Even considered in the light most favorable to the State, 
there is no question the case against Long was not compelling, 
although somewhat sufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly, 
this case is Emmett revisited. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. 
On Count I, Ms. Kastenbader testified that Long was with 
WJL on January 28, when the child was taken to the hospital for 
bruises on his face. Long's explanation that the child must have 
been pulled off the couch by his sister was not supported by 
medical evidence. There is evidence also stemming from Ms. 
Kastenbader that Long was home with WJL on February 4, when the 
child turned blue and became unconscious, resulting in being 
hospitalized for brain damage. No other witness, however, 
corroborated Ms. Kastenbader. 
On Count II, Ms. Kastenbader testified that Long agreed 
to feed WJL on the night of May 4. The following day, May 5, Ms. 
Kastenbader noticed red dots all over WJL's face, and the child was 
eventually admitted to the hospital for broken ribs. Again, no 
other witness corroborated this testimony. 
50
 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1516 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1346 (1992) (assessing 
unrefuted evidence of overwhelming guilt arrayed against 
defendant); Sides, 944 F.2d at 1560 (same); Emmett, 839 P.2d at 
785-86 (same). 
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On the other hand, Long testified he was not home all day 
with WJL on February 4. He had gone to work with his father that 
day, and returned only to be told by Ms. Kastenbader that WJL was 
not breathing properly. Long's testimony was corroborated by Mrs. 
Long, particularly on the critical issue of whether Long was home 
with WJL on February 4. 
Long also testified that he had worked the second shift 
on May 4, arriving home around 1:15 a.m. and did not see WJL until 
the following morning when Ms. Kastenbader told him WJL had red 
dots on his face. Mrs. Long also testified to seeing Ms. 
Kastenbader sit on WJL, apparently because she was upset for not 
locating an adult to tend WJL. Medical testimony establishes that 
the WJL's injuries on May 5 were consistent with being squeezed or 
sat on by an adult. 
Neutral witnesses' testimony also weigh heavily in favor 
of Long. Dr. Gully, the forensic psychologist appointed by the 
juvenile court to assess the couple, testified that Ms. Kastenbader 
told him that Long was never abusive to WJL. In addition, he 
testified that Ms. Kastenbader had described her friend, Maggie 
Blackburn, as "two-faced." Ms. Kastenbader denied ever making 
these statements to Dr. Gully, who had no motive to prevaricate. 
The guardians ad litem also testified that Ms. Kastenbader showed 
no interest in WJL and gave inconsistent statements regarding the 
causes of WJL's injuries. Therefore, the credibility of Ms. 
Kastenbader had been called into question before the jury. 
- 43 -
Like Emmett, the entire State's case against Long was 
premised solely on the testimony of Ms. Kastenbader, which 
testimony was uncorroborated by any direct evidence of guilt and 
contradicted by the more neutral witnesses. Thus, the inadmissible 
police report, other bad acts, and prior convictions evidence, 
became the route through which the State circumvented long-standing 
evidentiary principles and spread inappropriate factors before the 
jury. In other words, without the inappropriate character 
evidence, the jury would have been left hopelessly confused as to 
who committed these offenses. If the jury had found Ms. 
Kastenbader less credible, particularly based on the testimony of 
Dr. Gully and the guardians ad litem, Long would have been 
acquitted. Looking at the cumulative nature of the errors, there 
is little doubt they were harmful and prejudicial. Given that 
evidence of Long's guilt was not strong and the fact that these 
errors presented him as less credible than his ex-wife, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. See Emmett, 839 P.2d 
at 786; Doporto, 935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 24 ("We cannot say 
with any assurance that absent the erroneous admission of the 
evidence of the prior crime evidence, the result would have been 
different."). 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the court placed no limit 
on the evidentiary value of the prior convictions and other bad 
acts. Consequently, the jury, contrary to "firmly entrenched ... 
rules of admissibility," was bound to consider the "prior 
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conviction as substantive evidence of [Long's] guilt."51 "Thus, in 
situations where no cautionary instruction is given to the jury, 
prejudicial error has intervened."52 Accordingly, Long is entitled 
to have his conviction reversed and a new trial ordered. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Independently or cumulatively, counsel's failure to 
competently represent Long's interest, as discussed above, was 
prejudicial, and thus requires that Long be given a new trial. In 
the alternative, it was plain error for the trial court not to have 
noticed counsel's errors. Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
the decision of the trial court, and remand the case for a new 
trial consistent with the Court's decision. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel hereby requests oral argument in this matter, for 
the issues raised are of significant constitutional magnitude. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 1997. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Wesley Long 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1978). 
See id. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this 
day of November, 1997, to Christine Soltis, Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division, at 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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ADDENDUM I 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
SIXTH AMENDMENT, U . S . CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in *ny way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United^States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to' enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1904 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 7 6-5-109 
7G-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age 
or less. 
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of 
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's 
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical 
injury as defined in this section. 
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury 
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's 
health, or which involves physical torture or causes seri-
ous emotional harm to the child, or which involves a 
substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of 
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or 
causing the child's head to impact with an object or 
surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot 
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon 
the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dan-
gerous weapon; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical inju-
ries inflicted by the same person, either at the same 
time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in 
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay 
or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's 
ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfig-
urement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease 
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful follow-
ing the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or 
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the 
child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical 
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or 
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child 
\B guilty of an oflense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree; 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misde-
meanor; 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class C misdemeanor. 
(4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted 
in the county or district where the oflense is alleged to have 
been committed, where the existence of the offense is discov-
ered, where the victim resides, or where the defendant resides. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 3 0 
Rule SO. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disre-
garded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after 
such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 103 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predi-
cated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 
a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known 
to the court by offer or was apparent from the context 
within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any 
other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, 
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be 
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmis-
sible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking ques-
tions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 403 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 4 04 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a par-
ticular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the pros-
ecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait 
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim 
ofTered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character 
of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 607 
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, 
including the party calling the witness. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 608 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of wit-
ness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of 
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the witness* credibility, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into 
on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the wit-
ness* character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) 
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of 
another witness as to which character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any 
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or 
the witness* privilege against self-incrimination when exam-
ined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to 
misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by 
examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 609 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the cred-
ibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to 
Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or impris-
onment in excess of one year under the law under which 
the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused 
has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the ac-
cused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is 
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed 
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness 
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever 
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported 
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 
ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance writ-
ten notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such 
evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of re-
habilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under 
this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subse-
quent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject 
of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based 
on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudi-
cations is generally not admissible under this rule. The court 
may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile 
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction 
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of 
an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence 
is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence. 
(e) Pondoncy of appeal. The pendency of an appeal there-
from does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. 
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ADDENDUM II 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
ORDER 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
WESLEY JAMES LONG 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT 
(JURY VERDICT) 
CASE NO. 941400117 (V) 
DATE: September 5, 1996 
JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK 
REPT. BY: Richard C. Tatton, CSR 
CLERK: NAH 
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of judgment and sentence. 
Assistant Attorney General Craig Barlow appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. 
The defendant was present. Appearing for the defendant was Ronald Yengich. 
The defendant was ordered to undergo and evaluation at the diagnostic unit at the 
Utah State Prison on the 7th day of June, 1996. The diagnostic unit sent this court a letter 
indicating they were unable to complete an evaluation because the defendant would not admit 
his guilt. 
Mr. Yengich addressed the court regarding sentencing. The defendant addressed 
the court. Mr. Barlow responds. Mr. Yengich responds. 
The Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence and 
Commitment: 
JUDGMENT 
On the 8th day of February, 1996, the defendant having been found guilty by a jury 
of the offenses of Counts I and II: Child Abuse, Second Degree Felonies , as charged in 
the Information; the Court finding no legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced, 
and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is ordered 
and adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant 
Wesley James Long is sentenced to be confined in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years on each count. Said sentences 
are to run concurrent one with the other. 
COMMITMENT 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison to 
be transported to the Utah County Jail and released for a period of 30 days on the bond 
previously posted in this case. The defendant is ordered to return to the Utah County Jail on 
Monday, October 7, 1996, at 8:00 a.m. to be transported to the Utah State Prison in 
execution of this judgment and sentence. 
Mr. Yengich requests that the court consider a 402 motion based on the 
circumstances of the case. Mr. Barlow objects. The Court requests that counsel brief the 
issue and file their memorandums within two weeks so the court may rule before October 7, 
1996. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 77-27-13(5), the Court provides the following 
information: 
(a) Terms for which the offender, in the opinion of the Court, should be 
imprisoned: As prescribed by the Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines. 
(b) Character of the offender: Unknown 
(c) Aggravating Circumstances: Unknown 
(d) Mitigating Circumstances: Unknown 
Dated this 5th day of September, 1996. 
BY/TflE CPURT-
i^er~~~es*Z& 
. 'I 
ADDENDUM III 
MINUTE ENTRY RE: ADMISSION OF 
OTHER ACTS 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARM* B.SMITH, Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
WESLEY JAMES LONG, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY - JURY TRIAL 
CASE NO: 941400117 
DATE: October 23 - 25, 1995 
JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK 
REPT BY: Vonda Bassett, CSR and 
Creed Barker, CSR 
CLERK: NAH 
This matter is before the Court for a jury trial. Assistant Attorney General, Craig 
Barlow, is present for the State of Utah. The defendant is present and represented by Danny 
Frazier. 
Counsel meets with the court in chambers regarding the State's 404(b) motion. Mr. 
Barlow addresses the court regarding that motion. Mr. Frazier objects. The Court grants 
the State's 404(b) motion in regard to the statements made by the defendant to Jaime Conder 
Kastenbader during the pregnancy, the victim supposedly falling off the couch, and as to the 
defendant shaking and spanking Nessia, and pulling her hair. 
Court proceeds with the jury panel seated and all parties present and ready to 
proceed. 
The jurors are qualified for term and are as follows: Thad S, Burr, Christopher 
L.A. Meek, Joyce C. Oliphant, Aria J.N. Wilding, Betsy M. Devincent 
The jurors are sworn as to their competency. 
Court recesses to meet with counsel in chambers. Mr. Frazier makes a motion to 
recuse the jury panel due to a statement made out loud by juror number one. Mr. Barlow 
objects. The Court denies Mr. Frazier's motion to recuse the jury panel. 
0000014 
ADDENDUM IV 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
PILED 7- m~<n 
e ? S ^ J c u d ' c , a , D , 8 , r , c * c o V r t ' l 
or Utah County, state of I I I«I . 
RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 3 55-03 20 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESLEY JAMES LONG, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 941400117 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr, 
The above-entitled matter came on for an evidentiary 
hearing on defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment or for New Trial 
and defendant's 402 motion. Assistant Attorney General Craig L. 
Barlow was present on behalf of the State of Utah; the defendant 
was present in person and represented by counsel, Ronald J. 
Yengich. 
Counsel met with the Court in chambers. 
The Court indicated that counsel had filed extensive 
briefs on both issues and felt that the issues had been fully 
covered. Therefore, the Court made its ruling based upon the 
memoranda received from counsel. 
-0/V -f -* 
The Court denies defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment or 
for New Trial. The Court finds that no plain error existed or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Yengich makes a Motion for Certificate of Probable 
Cause pending the appeal and requests that bail be set in the 
amount previously posted by the defendant. 
The Court prefaces the following ruling with some 
comments. The Court grants defendant's Motion for Certificate of 
Probable Cause. The Court sets bail at $10,000 cash or bond as 
previously posted. 
SIGNED BY MY HAND this /*T day of \j^Ut^ , 1997. 
irg®^ 
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